Showing posts with label wireshark. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wireshark. Show all posts

Thursday, 24 September 2015

VXLAN Support Added to Stripe


I've been looking into VXLAN over the last couple of days and the header turns out to be a very simple fixed-length affair so I thought I would add VXLAN decapsulation support into Stripe.

If you're not familiar with Stripe, it is a command line tool which loads in a pcap file and strips off any VLAN / MPLS / GRE / PPPoE / L2TP / GTP or VXLAN headers it finds, re-assembling any IP fragments it finds along the way. The mechanism is explained in a previous post for anyone interested.

Stripe can be downloaded from github: https://github.com/theclam/stripe - if you try it, please share your experience (good or bad)!

Monday, 15 June 2015

Re-assembling IP Fragments in PCAP Files

Some time ago I created "stripe", a tool for stripping back layers of encapsulation headers from PCAP files leaving plain payload (typically IP) over Ethernet. "stripe" works with a variety of encapsulation types, from simple VLAN tags up to GRE and GTP, however one thing that stripe couldn't handle was if packets were fragmented after being encapsulated.

One user, LisbethS, suggested that I should build in IP fragment reassembly capabilities into stripe, however my first thought was that the two should be separate utilities. As I thought about it more, though, I realised that the two functions (decapsulation and re-assembly) were actually intertwined - if you treat them as separate processes then you can't re-assemble IP that is encapsulated within something else, nor can you decapsulate GRE or GTP that has been fragmented. The key, then, was to do both re-assembly and decapsulation as part of the same process.

Reassembling Packet Fragments


RFC 815 describes a minimal way to re-assemble IP fragments which is not that complex in principle, so I thought I'd add the functionality. I soon realised it wasn't quite as straightforward as I thought and you have to be very careful about the order of operations.

For example, if you have a packet that gets encapsulated then subsequently fragmented, then trying to decapsulate without reassembling first will fail (the first fragment decapsulates to a partial frame, then the subsequent fragment(s) fail to decapsulate). On the other hand, if you re-assemble first then decapsulate then you don't catch the case where a packet is fragmented before encapsulation. Neither approach can catch the case where a packet is fragmented, then encapsulated, then subsequently fragmented again.

To cut a long story short, the answer appears to be that you need to iteratively re-assemble, decapsulate until fragments are found, re-assemble again, decapsulate again... until there are no more fragments and everything is fully decapsulated.

Anyway, stripe now does both decapsulation and IP fragment re-assembly, meaning that it can take a pcap file containing fragmented and / or encapsulated packets, strip off all the encapsulation and re-assemble the fragments and write out the result to a new pcap file.

Download


The latest version is available for download at https://github.com/theclam/stripe - it is available as source code (compiles without dependancies in almost any Linux distro) and there are also Mac and Windows binaries for easy download.

UPDATE:

I've managed to recreate some of the SEGFAULTs that people have been kindly reporting to me. It turns out there was a typo / n00b mistake (I'm not sure which, most of this is coded way too late at night) which I have now corrected. If you tried before and got an error, it may be fixed now. The memory leaks have also been reduced from "raging" to "moderate" :)

Friday, 23 January 2015

Adjusting timestamps in PCAP files

Many times in the past I've had to look at a pair of pcap files side by side in order to troubleshoot an issue. More often than not, one of the PCAP files was produced on a ropey old laptop whose clock is "almost right" - the timestamps between the two files then don't tie up and it is a pain to keep working out "if it's time X in that file, I need to look at time Y in this file..."

This week I overheard a colleague in the office having exactly that problem and thought it wouldn't be too hard to build a utility to time shift pcap files by a specified amount. So here it is:


Installation


As explained in the readme, it should be possible to compile on any system with gcc using only the standard libraries. Just download the capshift.c and capshift.h files and compile (gcc -o capshift capshift.c), or download a binary if one exists for your system.

Usage


Capshift takes three arguments, all mandatory:

  • The input pcap file, specified using -r
  • The output pcap file, specified using -w
  • The time offset value (positive or negative), specified using -o

Here's an example:


Harrys-MacBook-Air:capshift foeh$ tshark -ta -r before.cap
  1 15:30:45.978539 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4748/35858, ttl=128
  2 15:30:45.979407 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4748/35858, ttl=255
  3 15:30:46.979315 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4749/36114, ttl=128
  4 15:30:46.980274 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4749/36114, ttl=255
  5 15:30:47.980323 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4750/36370, ttl=128
  6 15:30:47.981215 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4750/36370, ttl=255
  7 15:30:48.981387 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4751/36626, ttl=128
  8 15:30:48.982277 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4751/36626, ttl=255
Harrys-MacBook-Air:capshift foeh$ capshift -r before.cap -w after.cap -o -0.5

Parsing capfile, attempting to shift backward by 0.500000 seconds...

8 frames processed.
Harrys-MacBook-Air:capshift foeh$ tshark -ta -r after.cap
  1 15:30:45.478539 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4748/35858, ttl=128
  2 15:30:45.479407 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4748/35858, ttl=255
  3 15:30:46.479315 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4749/36114, ttl=128
  4 15:30:46.480274 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4749/36114, ttl=255
  5 15:30:47.480323 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4750/36370, ttl=128
  6 15:30:47.481215 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4750/36370, ttl=255
  7 15:30:48.481387 192.168.1.25 -> 192.168.1.1 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) request  id=0x0001, seq=4751/36626, ttl=128
  8 15:30:48.482277 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.25 ICMP 74 Echo (ping) reply    id=0x0001, seq=4751/36626, ttl=255

As usual, if you find this useful or have any feedback (good or bad) please leave a comment!

Thursday, 27 November 2014

Removing VLAN/MPLS/PPPoE/GRE/GTP/VXLAN Encapsulation Headers from pcap Files

Many years ago, when I worked in a school, I used to port mirror our proxy server to an old PC running driftnet and leave the screen where the kids could see it as a warning that staff could "see what you're doing on the Internet". I haven't played with driftnet since but certainly at the time it could only handle native frames (no VLAN tags, certainly no MPLS or PPPoE). I vaguely remember some other tools being similar, unfortunately I can't remember which ones.

Looking at the analytics for this blog, I can see I'm not the only one who's had the problem. It's certainly not the number one issue that people are searching for when they get here but there have been a few and the thought occurred that the packet processing engine I wrote for dechap would be really good for this task - it already stripped back VLANs and MPLS, plus it knows how to detect PPPoE and L2TP.

After a couple of hours it was working to the point of being able to strip VLANs and MPLS off, with a little more effort PPPoE also gave way. GRE came quite easily, too, as it has simple headers and uses the same etypes as Ethernet.

Anyway, here is "stripe" (from STRIP Encapsulation), a command line tool which takes a pcap file as input, re-assembles IP fragments and strips off all the encap it can (currently VLAN tags, MPLS shim headers, PPPoE, L2TP, GRE GTP and VXLAN) then outputs another pcap containing just payload over Ethernet.

**UPDATE** - Version 0.3b now adds support for VXLAN.

Download


Stripe is available from my github: https://github.com/theclam/stripe

Usage


The command line is pretty straightforward, as shown in the online help:

Harrys-MacBook-Air:stripe foeh$ ./stripe
stripe: a utility to remove VLAN tags, MPLS shims, PPPoE, L2TP headers,
etc. from the frames in a PCAP file and return untagged IP over Ethernet.
Version v0.1 alpha, November 2014

Usage:
./stripe -r inputcapfile -w outputcapfile

Where inputcapfile is a tcpdump-style .cap file containing encapsulated IP 
outputcapfile is the file where the decapsulated IP will be saved

Harrys-MacBook-Air:stripe foeh$ 

Simply specify the files you want to read encapsulated packets from (-r) and write the cleaned up packets to (-w). Stripe will remove as many layers of encap as it can until you are left with straight payload over Ethernet.

How it Works


The majority of stripe's work is done by the "decap" function. This function takes in a block of memory, a length parameter, a data type hint and a frame template. The process runs as follows:


  1. If the type is Ethernet, populate the source / destination MACs of the frame template
  2. If the type has an Ethertype or protocol type field, use this to populate the ethertype of the frame template
  3. If the next protocol is possibly or definitely payload, set the payload pointer of the frame template to the address of the next protocol and return
  4. If the next protocol is possibly or definitely encapsulation, call decap against the remainder of the packet
So essentially it eats up encap, recording MACs and protocol types as it goes, until there is no more encap left. By the end there is a fully populated frame template with source and destination MAC (the innermost copy if there are multiple as in the case of MPLS pseudowires), the etherype of the payload and the payload itself. Piecing these together gives a minimally encapsulated frame, i.e. one with just an Ethernet header and payload.

Here is a worked example for a frame with VLAN, MPLS, GRE over IP and an IP payload:


Step 1 - The "decap" function is called on the entire frame. Since the first header is Ethernet, the frame template gets populated with the source / destination MACs and the etype from the Ethernet header. The frame template's length field gets populated with the size of the frame minus the Ethernet header and the payload pointer is adjusted to point at the next header. The decap function then calls itself on the remainder of the frame, hinting that the type is VLAN tag based on the current header's etype.


Step 2 - The decap function now considers the partial frame starting at the VLAN tag. Since the VLAN tag has an etype associated, the frame template's etype is overwritten with the one from the VLAN header. The length is overwritten with the length of the payload after the VLAN header and the pointer adjusted to point at the next header. The decap function then calls itself again with a hint of MPLS, based on the etype in the VLAN header.


Step 3 - The decap function now considers the partial frame starting at the MPLS label. Since the MPLS label is bottom of stack, we know there are no more MPLS labels left . Unfortunately there is no protocol type in an MPLS header (these are signaled on the control plane) so we have to take a peek at the byte immediately following the label. If we find a "4" or a "6" in the high order nibble then we have to guess that the next protocol is IPv4 or IPv6, respectively. If the following four bytes are all zeroes then we assume Ethernet over MPLS with control word, otherwise we assume Ethernet over MPLS without control word. In this case we find a 4 in the low nibble, so call decap with an "IP" hint.


Step 4 - The IP header tells us that GRE is the next protocol so for now nothing changes in the frame template (the remainder could be decodable or not). We just call decap again on the GRE part...



Step 5 - The GRE header is decoded and the etype is copied into the frame header. The length of the remaining payload is updated in the frame template and the pointer is adjusted. Decap is called on the next header, which is IP. When the decap function inspects the IP payload it can go no further and just returns the frame template.



In essence, the process has started with a deeply encapsulated frame and ended with IP over Ethernet. The source and destination MACs are taken from the innermost ones found (which in this case is the outermost Ethernet header) but with the etype changed to match the payload, which is the first non-encapsulating payload found in the frame, in this case the second IP.

References

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2784
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1701
http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1Q.html
http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/29060.htm

Saturday, 5 October 2013

Be Careful where you use TACACS!

As part of my on-going work to add more and more protocols into my hobby project dechap, I started looking into the workings of TACACS+ today. I was looking to see whether TACACS+ would be a likely candidate as the next attackable protocol. I had in my mind a couple of events from my past that made me suspect that a TACACS+ server couldn't really tell when an incorrect key was in use, other than that the packet decoded to garbage that it was then not able to interpret. If that is the case, it would be very hard to attack the protocol as there is not a straightforward way to tell when you've hit the correct key. I'll let you know when I've figured that out because as I read the protocol spec something else derailed my train of thought.

Like most network engineers I was raised on Cisco's literature and read through plenty of their whitepapers such as this one comparing RADIUS and TACACS+. This document is full of useful facts such as "RADIUS does not allow users to control which commands can be executed on a router and which cannot" (no, Cisco, because for some reason you notched out the ability to do so in IOS) and that RFC compliance doesn't guarantee interoperability. One of the parts I always remembered and believed, in the olden days at least, was the part that says that far beyond the argument of TCP being better than UDP, TACACS+ is more secure than RADIUS due to the way it encrypts the entire message body. I suspect most people just swallow that without chewing, I know I did. Encryption is good, so more encryption must be better.

RADIUS, by comparison, uses CHAP for secure password authentication but makes no attempt to encrypt the parameters within requests and responses. To be fair, these can just be read in plain text straight off the wire. The shared key used when configuring RADIUS is purely an authentication measure - it guards against arbitrary spoofed requests and tampering but does not offer any kind of privacy.

In reality the biggest part of the decision when choosing one or the other will be a "horses for courses" argument. Want to authenticate PPP subscribers with a nice wholesale / retail proxy model? Use RADIUS. Want to authenticate logins to infrastructure devices and authorise specific commands down to the parameter level? Use TACACS+.

A Slightly More Balanced Comparison

Let's compare the relative merits, security wise of each protocol.

Message Encryption

TACACS+, as previously mentioned, encrypts the entire message body using a pre-shared key. It only leaves the header in the clear, so without the key it is only really possible to determine who is client and who is server, plus what kind of messages are being passed (authentication or authorisation, query or response).

RADIUS uses a pre-shared key to authenticate messages going back and forth, but the messages themselves are unencrypted and can easily be read straight off the wire.

Credentials

RADIUS relies on CHAP for user credential validation. The NAS sends a "random" challenge to the user, who produces a one-way hash of the challenge data and password (plus some other stuff) and returns that to the NAS. The NAS then sends the challenge and response off to the RADIUS, meaning that the credentials are never sent over the wire in any reversible way. In order to get the password an attacker must capture the challenge and response data then run a dictionary or brute force attack. On the down side, the RADIUS server itself must have a plaintext copy of the password available in order to verify that a response is correct given the challenge. Clearly if the RADIUS server's password database is compromised then things get quite sticky. For proxy RADIUS, the proxy does not need access to plaintext passwords. In summary, passwords are safe in flight but exposed at rest.

TACACS+ relies on the pre-shared key to encrypt everything, including password information. No form of CHAP or similar system is used, so credentials are passed in a reversible form over the wire. It's encrypted, though, so don't worry - unless an attacker knows the key it's all just gibberish. On the positive side of this, the TACACS+ server does not need to store plaintext passwords for the end users and can instead keep one-way hashes on disk meaning that a compromised database is arguably less of an issue. Safe at rest and safe in flight.

Or is it? Think about the typical use case again. TACACS+ is more-or-less always used to authenticate CLI users logging into routers and switches. The key used to encrypt the TACACS+ communications is stored in the device config, either completely in plain text or using (trivially) reversible type 7 encryption. Virtually all devices are left with the password recovery mechanism enabled. Most of the time the key is re-used across every device in the estate since it makes administration easy and, what's the risk anyway?

A Really Easy Attack

I'd like to point out I'm not suggesting or endorsing any kind of illegal or immoral behaviour. Even as a joke :)

The thought occurs that many TACACS+ managed devices are in remote locations - far flung or sparsely populated offices, in accessible wiring closets, even (*shudder*) customer sites. Given physical access to a device, it's very possible to make a terminal emulator script to perform a password recovery, dump out the config then reset the config register to its original value within only a couple of seconds more than it takes to double-reboot the device. I know this because I did it many moons ago (I don't have it any more - it was pretty easy to write, though).

If I were an evil adversary who wanted to get some credentials, perhaps a good way would be:
  1. Feign a power cut, on-site work or some other convincing reason for a device to go down
  2. Take the device off the network (to avoid it phoning home by syslog / SNMP) and perform a quick password recovery / config dump before putting it back to its original condition:

  3. *break*
    Readonly ROMMON initialized
    program load complete, entry point: 0x8000f000, size: 0xcb80

    monitor: command "boot" aborted due to user interrupt
    rommon 1 > confreg 0x2142

    You must reset or power cycle for new config to take effect
    rommon 2 > reset

    *snip snip*
    Would you like to enter the initial configuration dialog? [yes/no]: no

    Press RETURN to get started!

    Router>enable
    Router#show startup-config | include tacacs
    aaa authentication login default group tacacs+ local
    aaa authorization exec default group tacacs+ none
    aaa authorization configuration default group tacacs+
    tacacs-server host 10.4.4.10
    tacacs-server key supersecret
    Router#conf t
    Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z.
    Router(config)#config-register 0x2102
    Router(config)#^Z
    Router#reload
    System configuration has been modified. Save? [yes/no]: no
    Proceed with reload? [confirm]


  4. Stick a sniffer inline between the device and wherever its administrators are
  5. Call in a fault saying that since the power cut / whatever nothing attached to that router / switch is able to see the network - perhaps leave the LAN side disconnected for authenticity
  6. Capture TACACS+ packets as the administrators log in to investigate
  7. Come up with some compelling reason for comms to go down again while the sniffer is taken out
Now with the config dump it is trivial to get the TACACS server key - it's either just there in the clear or can be decoded from the type 7 encrypted version using any number of free tools. If you put this key into the TACACS+ protocol settings of Wireshark (in the preferences screen expand the protocols area then scroll down to TACACS+), it will happily decrypt the captured packets from step 5:


Configuring Wireshark
Viewing the Decrypted Payload


Now you have the administrator username(s) and password(s) in plain text!

Yikes!

Are you sure you still want to run TACACS on that remote box?

Thursday, 3 October 2013

BGP support added to dechap

Hot on the heels of adding the ability to attack OSPF MD5 authentication, I've added BGP support to dechap. It is now possible to feed a pcap file with PPPoE, L2TP, RADIUS, OSPF and BGP packets to the same tool and perform offline dictionary attacks on the authentications within.

As usual, if you're not interested in the theory just skip right to the end for the download link.

TCP MD5 Signatures

BGP authentication uses the MD5 Signature TCP option field, which is defined in RFC 2385. Personally, I found this RFC very vague and it took a lot of iterations to get the technique right. It's particularly fuzzy about what is included in the hash, what isn't and how to present values correctly. I'm hoping to document the process a little more clearly for the next poor guy who tries to implement it as I couldn't find a sufficiently detailed reference anywhere.

RFC 2385 states that the hash must be calculated over the following:

1. the TCP pseudo-header (in the order: source IP address,
   destination IP address, zero-padded protocol number, and
   segment length)
2. the TCP header, excluding options, and assuming a checksum of
   zero
3. the TCP segment data (if any)
4. an independently-specified key or password, known to both TCPs
   and presumably connection-specific

Now, maybe it's just me, but this raised a lot of questions in my mind. Zero padding usually means to fill the trailing space with zeros, but padding the second byte would effectively multiply the protocol number by 256 so should it be a leading zero? Which headers and options are included in the "segment length"? Should the pad bytes be copied with the TCP header?

Through a lot of trial and error I found that:
  • The zero padding goes before the protocol number
  • The "segment length" includes the TCP header, the TCP options (including room for the MD5 signature option being calculated) and the actual payload data
  • The copied TCP header should be 20 bytes long, i.e. includes two padding bytes after the (zeroed out) checksum. The header length remains as-is, including the length of the options.
  • The TCP segment data starts immediately after the TCP options and runs to the last byte indicated by the IP length field
  • The null byte terminating the password is not passed to the hash algorithm
 The resulting hash value is then stored inside the MD5 signature option (kind 19, length 18).

Checking / Attacking BGP Packets

Using the above method it is straightforward to run a dictionary attack as follows:


  • Start with a sniffed BGP packet (see the original dechap blog post for info on how this is extracted).
  • Extract and store the authentication hash (look for option kind 19) for later comparison
  • Put together the "pseudoheader" as described above
  • Append the TCP header without options
  • Append the TCP payload
  • Append the candidate password
  • Calculate the MD5 hash over the complete data set and compare to the value seen in the sniffed packet. A matching hash indicates a matching password.
As of v0.4a, dechap can now be used to automate this process.

Obtaining the Tool

The C source code may be downloaded from: https://github.com/theclam/dechap

Provided the OpenSSL dev libraries are installed it should be possible to simply extract the source code, cd into the directory then run "make". I've only tested this under Ubuntu Linux but there are very few dependancies so I would imagine it will work on most distributions.

Using the Tool

As usual - this is for legitimate audit and recovery purposes and must not be used for any kind of malicious activity.

The usage is pretty straightforward - there are only two parameters and both are mandatory. Specify your capture file (original pcap format) with the -c flag and your word list with the -w flag. Here's an example:

lab@lab:~/dechap$ ./dechap -w mywords.txt -c bgp.cap
Found password "password1" for TCP from 10.0.0.2 to 10.0.0.1.
Found password "password1" for TCP from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.2.
Found password "password1" for TCP from 10.0.0.2 to 10.0.0.1.
lab@lab:~/dechap$
I'm not sure how quickly it runs but it doesn't seem quite as quick as the OSPF version. I suppose BGP packets tend to be a little bigger than OSPF so there's more to hash. You can improve the speed by only including one packet for each source / destination pair in each capture as, at present, it doesn't check for multiple packets between pairs and attacks each instance individually.

If you try this out, please leave a comment on this post with your experiences - good or bad. Any suggestions would also be welcome, particularly for other protocols to attack.

References

RFC2385 - Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option
RFC1321 - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm


Thursday, 22 November 2012

tshark one-liners

Since most of the hits on this blog seem to come from tshark filter related searches, and since I spend a good part of my day either running or analysing packet captures, I thought it might be useful to create a series of "tshark one-liners" in homage to the brilliant "sed one-liners" collection compiled by Eric Pement.

These are capture filters, not display filters, and are equally applicable to Wireshark, tshark and tcpdump, since they all use the same pcap filter syntax. In wireshark the capture filter options are now hidden away and you have to double click on the interface under capture options to set or adjust the filter string.

The filters are broadly grouped by purpose and I will try to add more as I think of them. Please comment if there is something you think I have missed or would like added.

Note: if you want to strip off VLAN, MPLS, PPPoE or GRE headers from an existing pcap file, please see this post: Removing VLAN/MPLS/PPPoE/GRE Encapsulation

Ethernet

Match 802.1D spanning tree:
"ether dst 01:00:c2:00:00:00" (manpages say "ether proto stp" but I've had trouble with that)

Match Cisco PVST+:
"ether dst 01:00:0c:cc:cc:cd"

Match Cisco CDP / VTP / DTP / PAgP / UDLD:
"ether dst 01:00:0c:cc:cc:cc"

Match LLDP:
"ether proto 0x88cc"


Match LACP (slow protocols):
"ether dst 01:80:c2:00:00:02"

General IP
Match host A (10.0.0.1) communicating with host B (192.168.0.1):
"host 10.0.0.1 && host 192.168.0.1"

Match host A (10.0.0.1) communicating with anything on network B (192.168.0.0/24):
"host 10.0.0.1 && net 192.168.0.0/24"
or, if you don't like CIDR notation:
"host 10.0.0.1 && net 192.168.0.0 mask 255.255.255.0"

Match ARP:
"ether proto 0x0806"

Match DHCP:"udp port 67 || udp port 68"

VLANs

Match any traffic with at least one VLAN tag:
"vlan"

Match traffic with exactly one VLAN tag:
"vlan && not vlan"

Match traffic with an SVLAN of 100 and any CVLAN:
"vlan 100 && vlan"

Match traffic where the first VLAN tag has an 802.1p marking of:
0: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 0"
1: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 32"
2: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 64"
3: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 96"
4: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 128"
5: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 160"
6: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 192"
7: "vlan && ether[14] & 224 == 224"

Note: to match the second VLAN tag use "vlan && vlan && ether[18] & 224" on the left hand side of the equality.

MPLS

Match traffic with at least one MPLS label:
"mpls"

Match traffic with exactly one MPLS label (match S bit of first label):
"mpls && ether[16] & 1 == 1"

Match traffic with a first or single label of 12345:
"mpls 12345"

Match traffic with an inner (e.g. service) label of 67890:
"mpls && mpls 67890"

Match traffic with exactly three MPLS labels (e.g. traffic on facility bypass FRR):
"mpls && mpls && mpls && ether[24] & 1 == 1"

Match 6PE traffic:
With transport label: "mpls && mpls 2"
Without transport label (after PHP): "mpls 2"

Match traffic with an EXP marking (on the first label) of:
0: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 0"
1: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 2"
2: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 4"
3: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 6"
4: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 8"
5: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 10"
6: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 12"
7: "mpls && ether[16] & 14 == 14"

Note: to match the EXP marking of the second label, use "mpls && mpls && ether[20] & 14" on the left hand side of the equality.

Multicast

Match any Ethernet multicast:
"ether multicast"

Match IP multicast traffic:
"ip multicast"

Match IGMP traffic:
"ip proto 2" (the manpages say "ip proto igmp" but I've had trouble with that)

Match PIM traffic:
"ip proto 0x67" (the manpages say "ip proto pim" but I've had trouble with that)

OSPFv2

Match all OSPF:
"ip proto 89"

Match specific OSPF packet types:
Hello: "ip proto 89 && ip[20:2] == 0x0201"
DBD: "ip proto 89 && ip[20:2] == 0x0202"
LSR: "ip proto 89 && ip[20:2] == 0x0203"
LSU: "ip proto 89 && ip[20:2] == 0x0204"
LSA: "ip proto 89 && ip[20:2] == 0x0205"

IS-IS

Match all IS-IS traffic:
"isis"

Match specific IS-IS PDU types:
"l1", "l2", "iih", "lsp", "snp", "csnp" or "psnp"

BGP

Note: These rules do not handle multi-segment messages very well but they are good enough for most purposes.

Match only BGP OPEN messages:
"tcp port 179 && tcp[50] == 1"

Match only BGP UPDATE messages:
"tcp port 179 && tcp[50] & 5 != 0"

Match only BGP NOTIFICATION messages:
"tcp port 179 && tcp[50] == 3"

Match only BGP KEEPALIVE messages:
"tcp port 179 && tcp[50] == 4"

 L2TP

Match only L2TP control messages:
"udp port 1701 && udp[8:2] & 0x80ff == 0x8002"

Match L2TP control messages for tunnel ID 1234:
"udp port 1701 && udp[8:2] & 0x80ff == 0x8002 && udp[12:2] == 1234"

Match L2TP data messages for tunnel ID 1234:
"udp port 1701 && udp[8:2] & 0x80ff == 0x0002 && udp[10:2] == 1234"

Match L2TP control messages for session ID 5678:
"udp port 1701 && udp[8:2] & 0x80ff == 0x8002 && udp[14:2] == 5678"

Match L2TP data messages for session ID 5678:
"udp port 1701 && udp[8:2] & 0x80ff == 0x0002 && udp[12:2] == 5678"

PPPoE

Note: Offsets will need to be manually increased by 4 bytes  for each VLAN tag or MPLS label present.

Match PPPoE discovery phase (PADI / PADO / PADR / PADS / PADT):
"pppoed"

Match PPPoE session phase (i.e. PPP traffic):
"pppoes"

Match PPPoE LCP messages:
"pppoes && ether[20:2] == 0xc021"

Match PPPoE CHAP authentication messages:
"pppoes && ether[20:2] == 0xc223"

Monday, 19 November 2012

Using Capture Filters to Match Higher Layer Protocols

In my previous post I went through some of the tricks that can be used to match MPLS and / or 802.1Q tagged traffic in packet filters. That's a great benefit when analysing traffic on carrier networks or large corporate networks but it only goes up to the transport layer (i.e. TCP and UDP port numbers).

Sometimes it's very desirable to filter on upper layer protocol information which has no corresponding parameters in the pcap-filter syntax. Take for example a situation where you are monitoring a busy BGP route reflector where you only want to see NOTIFICATION messages without all the KEEPALIVEs  and UPDATEs cluttering things up. It's possible to match these cases quite easily using a display filter, however your capture files could get quite large in relation to the amount of useful data. Once again it would be nice to be able to restrict at source, using a capture filter.

The following method can be used reliably for some protocols, somewhat reliably for a few and is completely inapplicable to others. In general if your protocol uses a fixed packet format or you want to match part of a fixed-format header then you're in luck.

Many protocols such as RADIUS, encode their parameters using attribute / value pairs (AVPs) or type / length / value (TLV) format, which can present parameters in an arbitrary order. If the parameter you want to match is in an AVP or TLV, your results are likely to be variable at best. Remember that capture filters work on fixed offsets and cannot cycle through parameters until the right one is found. If you're lucky the particular implementation you're looking at may put the AVPs / TLVs into the same order every time and your value may be early enough in the list not to get 'bumped' by other parameters inserted before it. In general, though, this technique is unlikely to work well.

Method

If at all possible, the best approach is to get a few sample packets of the data you want to capture. The captures should be taken from the same point in the network where you intend to run the real mirror to avoid any differences in encapsulation that would throw out the offsets. Generally it's possible to 'seed' such packets by, for example, manually clearing sessions.

In our example, we want to just see the BGP packets which contain a NOTIFICATION message. We start by obtaining a sample capture, obtained by shutting down a BGP session at one end while sniffing at the point where we intend to monitor. Below is the capture we get, with the interesting packet selected:


Here we can see there are two VLAN headers, beyond which we can see the IP details and the expanded decode of the BGP message. Logically, if we want to catch all the NOTIFICATION messages, we need to do the following:
  • Parse and discard the VLAN tags so that IP can be decoded correctly
  • Match only TCP traffic using either source or destination port 179
  • Of this, match only those packets of type NOTIFICATION
Starting at the first line, we can begin to write our capture filter. Assuming that we don't care which VLAN IDs are being used, just that they are present, the following will match traffic with any two VLAN tags:

"vlan && vlan"

Note that this not only matches traffic which has two VLAN headers - it also adjusts the decoding offset. This is critical to the success of the filter as in a normal, untagged frame the IP header would start directly after the Ethernet header at offset 14 (decimal). With two VLAN tags, the IP header will actually be at offset 20 (decimal). By matching the VLAN tags in this way, the capture filter knows that the IP will start further into the frame. The same happens with the "mpls" and "pppoes" keywords, so if you have these headers make sure you match them.

So next we want to make sure that only BGP packets are matched - this is as simple as you would expect using "tcp port 179" - this will match either a source or a destination port of 179 so you don't have to worry about which end initiated the BGP session. Let's add it to the expression:

"vlan && vlan && tcp port 179"

Now this rule will match any double-tagged BGP traffic. The tricky part is that there are no capture filter keywords for matching BGP packet types and we want to do precisely that. The only option remaining for us is to match bytes at a given offset. Eek!

It takes a little getting used to but for fixed format headers it can be very reliable. I find the easiest way to do this is to:
  • Select the field you want to match in Wireshark
  • Find the offset in the packet where that value is stored
  • Set a filter to match the required value at the required offset


So in our example, I have selected the BGP message type. This is at offset 005C hex / 92 decimal and a type of NOTIFICATION is encoded as a byte of value 3. A simple filter to match this would be "ether[92] == 3". Matching this on its own would get all the BGP NOTIFICATIONs, but also a load of other junk so let's combine it with the rest of our filter:

"vlan && vlan && tcp port 179 && ether[92] == 3"

OK, we can be pretty sure now that this will only match genuine NOTIFICATIONs. The BGP header ip to and including the type field is fixed length, so it is not going to move, and the value of 3 always means NOTIFICATION. Now let's test it out with a real capture on the same conversation as above:

root@sniff:~# tshark -i eth1 "vlan && vlan && tcp port 179 && ether[92] == 3"

Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous.
Capturing on eth1
  0.000000      1.1.1.2 -> 1.1.1.1      BGP NOTIFICATION Message
^C1 packet captured
root@sniff:~#


Perfect. Exactly what we wanted to capture!

Note: It's easy to see the offset from the start of the frame by just looking at the packet capture, but where possible you should consider using offsets from IP or TCP. That way, if you want to re-use your filter with more or less encap, you can just add or remove VLANs, MPLS, etc, without having to re-calculate the offsets.

You will have to use your imagination and ingenuity to work out whether this technique can be used to match your interesting traffic reliably. There are many aspects I have not covered which may prove essential, depending on what you are trying to do, for example:
  • It is possible to match multiple byte fields using [offset:size] notation in place of the simple [offset] used in this example
  • It is possible to bitmask values using the normal bitwise operators, so for example to check if the least significant bit of byte 80 is set, the expression "ether[80] & 1 == 1" can be used
  • Offsets within a protocol can be used, i.e. ip[12]. Offsets like this start from the beginning of the layer being referenced.
  • It is possible to put together some very complex filter statements using AND (&&), OR (||) and NOT (!) operators in conjunction with parentheses.
See the pcap-filter manpage for further details. With experimentation you can almost certainly filter out most of the junk even if it is not possible to cut it out altogether.

Final Tip

While you are practising with these filters you will probably find that you make mistakes with offsets and generally defining the filter correctly. One good way to learn and also to prove your filters work before deploying them is to take a live capture at the point where you plan to sniff, then, on a non-production box, use tcpreplay to pass the traffic while capturing with your filter applied.

References

RFC 4271 - A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4) -  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271
pcap-filter manpage - http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/lucid/man7/pcap-filter.7.html

Monday, 23 January 2012

Using Capture Filters with Encapsulated Packets

One of the most annoying things I found when I started working on carrier networks was that while Wireshark's display filters worked perfectly, the capture filters frequently did not. I would regularly set up a capture filter only to find that no packets at all were saved - that's a real pain if you want to pull a few easily described packets out of a 50 Mbps stream across a period of 20 minutes.

After a while I realised that my problem was related to encapsulation. Unlike the hierarchical and detailed display filters, capture filters have to be really fast - that basically means using bit masks and comparing values at fixed offsets. With plain old untagged Ethernet frames the filters work fine, however as soon as you add 802.1Q tags, PPP or MPLS suddenly all the offsets are no longer valid and anything you match will be purely coincidental.

Luckily there are filter keywords to handle that situation. All of the following adjust the offsets for you each time they are used:

vlan [x] - matches a single VLAN tag, the ID of which may optionally be specified by the user
pppoes - matches a PPPoE session header
mpls [x] - matches a single MPLS label, the number of which may optionally be specified by the user

These are very flexible - for example if you are capturing QinQ traffic, you could match all the SMTP packets using:

vlan && vlan && tcp port 25

If you know the VLAN IDs (or MPLS labels) in use, you can narrow the selection based on those. To show all the IGMP passing over a particular MPLS pseudowire with VLAN ID 200, you could use:

mpls 131066 && mpls 131068 && vlan 200 && pppoes && ip proto 2

For a long time I was using makeshift capture filters along the lines of "ether[39] = 2" to match pertinent bytes in the packet (see my next blog post for info on that) however you will probably agree this is much simpler. These filters are equally applicable to Wireshark, Tshark and tcpdump so they may be useful even when forced to capture using some really obscure UNIX box. For Tshark and tcpdump don't forget to put quotes around any expressions that use the ampersand (&).