A few months ago I released a tool called dechap which finds PPPoE, L2TP and RADIUS authentications in pcap files and performs dictionary attacks against them. Since writing dechap I've always thought it would be more useful if it were able to do a similar thing with OSPF packets.
Well, the good news is that I've finally got around to adding OSPF support to dechap! Woo and yay! If you just want the tool, scroll straight to the bottom. If you're interested in the theory, read on.
OSPF Authentication Basics
OSPF, or more accurately OSPFv2 as defined in RFC2328, has three options for authenticating incoming packets:
Null: no authentication is performed at all.
Password: a plaintext password is added in the clear to each OSPF packet. If the password contained in an incoming packet matches the one configured locally then the packet is considered valid and is processed, otherwise it is silently ignored.
Message Digest: an MD5 hash is calculated over a combination of the OSPF packet contents and the password. The hash output is then added to the OSPF packet before transmission. When a packet arrives, the receiving router computes an MD5 hash of the packet contents plus its locally stored password. If the calculated hash matches the one attached to the incoming packet then the check passes and the packet is processed; otherwise it is silently dropped.
Note that this is authentication only - in other words the password only serves to verify that the packet contents are authentic. It does not offer privacy, so all the information within the packet is visible in the clear.
OSPF MD5 Authentication Detail
One thing I found unclear in RFC 2328 was exactly what data the MD5 hash was calculated over. The RFC states:
Input to the authentication algorithm consists of the OSPF packet and the secret key.
... and clarifies that:
(a) The 16 byte MD5 key is appended to the OSPF packet.
(b) Trailing pad and length fields are added, as
specified in [Ref17].
(c) The MD5 authentication algorithm is run over the
concatenation of the OSPF packet, secret key, pad
and length fields, producing a 16 byte message
digest (see [Ref17]).
(d) The MD5 digest is written over the OSPF key (i.e.,
appended to the original OSPF packet). The digest is
not counted in the OSPF packet's length field, but
is included in the packet's IP length field. Any
trailing pad or length fields beyond the digest are
not counted or transmitted.
Confusingly, Ref17 refers to RFC1321, which defines the MD5 algorithm. MD5 defines a method to pad the input before the hash is calculated, so it's easy to assume that point (b) refers to that - it doesn't. I spent a couple of hours trying to work out why my hashes were coming out to the wrong value before finally figuring it out. To aid others, I've taken the liberty of rewriting the instructions so that they can be understood by thickos such as myself:
Calculating the MD5 Hash
In order to calculate the
correct MD5 hash, the following method should be used:
(a) Build the OSPF packet as normal, ensuring that the key number and authentication sequence number are populated. The OSPF length field must contain the total number of bytes in the packet at this point. The checksum must be set to zero.
(b) The authentication key / password in plaintext must be adjusted to exactly 16 bytes, i.e. if the key is longer than 16 bytes then it must be truncated, shorter keys must be padded with null (0x00) bytes until 16 bytes long. The resulting 16 byte "modified authentication key" is then appended to the packet.
(c) The MD5 hash must be calculated over the entire result, i.e. the original OSPF packet plus the 16 byte modified authentication key.
(d) The resulting hash is then written over the modified authentication key in the last 16 bytes of the packet.
Testing / Attacking OSPF Packets
Using the above method it is straightforward to run a dictionary attack as follows:
- Start with a sniffed OSPF packet (see the original dechap blog post for info on how this is extracted).
- Extract the original OSPF packet (start immediately after the IP header and continue up to the length specified in the OSPF header)
- Extract and store the authentication hash (the 16 bytes following the packet) for later comparison
- Zero out the checksum
- For each candidate password, pad or truncate to 16 bytes and append to the original OSPF packet.
- Calculate the MD5 hash as described above and compare to the value seen in the sniffed packet. A matching hash indicates a matching password.
As of v0.3a, dechap can now be used to automate this process.
Obtaining the Tool
The C source code may be downloaded from:
https://github.com/theclam/dechap
Provided
the OpenSSL dev libraries are installed it should be possible to simply
extract the source code, cd into the directory then run "make".
Using the Tool
As usual - this is for legitimate audit and recovery purposes and must not be used for any kind of malicious activity.
The usage is pretty straightforward -
there are only two parameters and both are mandatory. Specify your
capture file (original pcap format) with the -c flag and your word list
with the -w flag. Here's an example:
lab@lab:~/dechap$ ./dechap -w mywords.txt -c ospf-bcast.cap
Found password "password1" for user OSPF host 10.1.1.1 key 1.
Found password "password1" for user OSPF host 10.1.1.2 key 1.
Found password "password1" for user OSPF host 10.1.1.1 key 1.
lab@lab:~/dechap$
I haven't tried any serious benchmarks for this but it seems reasonably fast. In a worst case scenario (correct key not present) on my creaky old Athlon XP 2100 it can try 100k passwords in under 100ms.
If you try this out, please leave a comment on this post with your experiences - good or bad. Any suggestions would also be welcome (yes, I know BGP exists).
References
RFC2328 - OSPF Version 2
RFC1321 - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
